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Absztrakt. 
A cikkben a kooperatív játékelmélet fogalmait alkalmazzuk egy ellátási lánc esetében. Az 
ostorcsapás-hatás elemeit egy beszállító-termelı ellátási láncban ragadjuk meg egy Arrow-
Karlin  típusú  modellben  lineáris  készletezési  és  konvex  termelési  költség  mellett. 
Feltételezzük,  hogy  mindkét  vállalat  minimalizálja  a  fontosabb  költségeit.  Két  mőködési 
rendszert  hasonlítunk  össze:  egy  hierarchikus  döntéshozatali  rendszert,  amikor  elıször  a 
termelı, majd a beszállító optimalizálja helyzetét, majd egy centralizált (kooperatív) modellt, 
amikor a vállalatok az együttes költségüket minimalizálják. A kérdés úgy merül fel, hogy a 
csökkentett ostorcsapás-hatás esetén hogyan osszák meg a részvevık ebben a transzferálható 
hasznosságú kooperatív játékban. 
 
Kulcsszavak: Optimális irányítás, Ellátási lánc, Ostorcsapás-hatás, Kooperatív játékelmélet 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. 
In  this  paper  we  apply  cooperative  game  theory  concepts  to  analyze  supply  chains.  The 
bullwhip effect in a two-stage supply chain (supplier-manufacturer) in the framework of the 
Arrow-Karlin model with linear-convex cost functions is considered. It is assumed that both 
firms  minimize  their  relevant  costs,  and  two  cases  are  examined:  the  supplier  and  the 
manufacturer  minimize  their  relevant  costs  in  a  decentralized  and  in  a  centralized 
(cooperative) way. The question of how to share the savings of the decreased bullwhip effect 
in the centralized (cooperative) model is answered by transferable utility cooperative game 
theory tools. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In the supply chain literature so far only non-cooperative game theory concepts were applied, 
see e.g. Kogan and Tapiero (2007) and Sethi at al. (2005). In this paper we analyze supply 
chains by cooperative game theory tools. Our main question is that how the manufacturer and 
the supplier should share the savings they achieve by harmonizing their production plans. We 
apply the following cooperative game theory concepts: the core (Gillies (1959)), the stable set 
(von  Neumann  and  Morgenstern  (1944)),  the  Shapley  value  (Shapley  (1953))  and  the 
nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) to answer the above question.   
In order to demonstrate the efficiency of cooperating in a supply chain we consider the so 
called  bullwhip  effect.  The  bullwhip  effect  explains  the  fluctuations  of  sales  (demand), 
manufacturing and supply. The bullwhip effect was first observed by Forrester (1961), later 
Lee et al. (1997) rediscovered this phenomenon. They mentioned four basic causes of the 
bullwhip effect: 
 
-  Forrester effect, or lead-times and demand signal processing, 
-  Burbidge effect, or order batching, 
-  Houlihan effect, or rationing and gaming, 
-  promotion effect, or price fluctuations. 
  
These (new) names were introduced by Disney et al. (2003). 
There  are  two  basic  models  to  investigate  the  decision  processes  of  a  firm:  the 
Wagner-Whitin and the Arrow-Karlin model. Both models have a stock-flow identity and a 
cost function. The difference between them lies in the cost functions. The well-known lot 
sizing model of Wagner and Whitin (1958) assumes a concave cost function. The second 
basic model applies a convex cost function.  
The  basis  of  this  investigation  is  the  well-known  Arrow-Karlin  type  dynamic 
production-inventory model (Arrow and Karlin, 1958). In this model the inventory holding 
cost is a linear function and the production cost is a non-decreasing and convex function of 
the production level. The latest empirical analysis, see Ghali (2003), shows that the convexity 
of the cost function is a reasonable assumption. 
The main goal of this paper is to demonstrate that cooperative game theory tools can 
be  applied  to  supply  chain  analysis.  We  consider  an  Arrow-Karlin-type  two-stage  supply 
chain and analyse whether the bullwhip effect appears in this model. To show that because of 
the bullwhip effect the cooperation of the manufacturer and the supplier induces savings, we 
develop two models: a decentralized and a centralized Arrow-Karlin-type supply chain model.  
The decentralized model assumes that first the manufacturer solves her production 
planning  problem  (the  market  demand  is  given  exogenously)  and  her  ordering  process  is 
based on the optimal production plan. Then the supplier minimizes her costs on the basis of 
the ordering of the manufacturer. In the centralized model it is assumed that the participants 
of the supply chain cooperate, i.e. they minimize the sum of their costs.  
In the next step we compare the production-inventory strategies and the costs of the 
manufacturer and supplier in the two models to show that the bullwhip effect can be reduced 
by cooperation (centralized model). This cooperation can be defined as a kind of information 
sharing between the parties of the supply chain.  
Finally, we discuss the question of how the manufacturer and the supplier should share 
the savings their cooperation induces. At this point we use concepts of transferable utility 
cooperative games. 
The paper is organized as follows. The decentralized model is discussed in Section 2. 
Section  3  analyzes  the  centralized  (cooperative)  supply  chain  model.  In  Section  4  we   4 
introduce some concepts of cooperative game theory and define supply chain (cooperative) 
games given by the models discussed in Sections 2 and 3. Moreover, we apply the above 
mentioned  four  solution  concepts  of  transferable  utility  cooperative  games  to  answer  the 
question of how the manufacturer and the supplier should share the savings, the result of their 
cooperation.  An  exact  number  example  is  given  in  Section  5.  The  last  section  briefly 
concludes. 
 
2 The decentralized system 
 
We consider a simple supply chain consisting of two firms: a supplier and a manufacturer. We 
assume that the firms are independent, i.e. each makes her decision to minimize her own 
costs. The firms have two stores: a store for raw materials and  a store for end products. 
Moreover, we assume that the input stores are empty, i.e. the firms can order suitable quantity 
and that they can get the ordered quantity. The production processes have a known, constant 
lead time. The material flow of the model is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Material flow in the models 
 
 
The following parameters are used in the models: 
 
T    length of the planning horizon, 
D(t)    the rate of demand, it is a continuous and differentiable function,  [ ] T t , 0 Î , 
hm    the inventory holding coefficient in the manufacturer’s product store, 
hs    the inventory holding coefficient in the supplier’s product store, 
Fm(Pm(t))  the production cost of the manufacturer at time t, it is a non-decreasing and 
strictly convex function, 
Fs(Ps(t))  the production cost of the supplier at time t, it is a non-decreasing and strictly 
convex function. 
 
The decision variables: 
 
) (t Im   the inventory level of the manufactured product, it is non-negative,  [ ] T t , 0 Î , 
) (t I s   the inventory level of the supplied product, it is non-negative,  [ ] T t , 0 Î , 
) (t P m   the rate of manufacturing, it is non-negative,  [ ] T t , 0 Î , 
) (t P s   the rate of supply, it is non-negative,  [ ] T t , 0 Î . 
 
The  decentralized  model  describes  the  situation  where  the  supplier  and  the 
manufacturer  optimize  independently,  we  mean  the  manufacturer  determines  its  optimal 
Im(t) 
Supplier  Manufacturer 
Production  Production 
Pm(t)  Pm(t)  Ps(t)  Ps(t)  Ps(t) 
Is(t) 
D(t)  Pm(t)   5 
production-inventory strategy first (the market demand is given exogenously), then she orders 
the necessary quantity of products to meet the known demand. Then the supplier accepts the 
order and minimizes her own costs. The cost functions of the supplier and the manufacturer 
consist of two parts: the quadratic production costs and the inventory costs. 
Next, we model the manufacturer in this Arrow-Karlin environment. The manufacturer 
solves the following problem: 
 
( ) [ ] min ) ( ) (
0
® + × =∫ dt t P F t I h J
T
m m m m m             (1) 
 s.t.    
 
T t I I t D t P t I m m m m £ £ = - = 0 , ) 0 ( ), ( ) ( ) ( 0 &           (2) 
 
Assume  that  the  optimal  production-inventory  policy  of  the  manufacturer  is 
( ) ) ( ), ( × ×
d
m
d
m P I  in model (1)-(2) and the manufacturer orders  ) (×
d
m P . Then the supplier solves the 
following problem: 
 
( ) [ ] min ) ( ) (
0
® + × =∫ dt t P F t I h J
T
s s s s s             (3) 
s.t. 
 
T t I I t P t P t I s s
d
m s s £ £ = - = 0 , ) 0 ( ), ( ) ( ) ( 0 &           (4) 
 
Notice that problem (3)-(4) has the same planning horizon [0,T] as that of model (1)-
(2). 
 
To  solve  problem  (1)-(2)  we  apply  the  Pontryagin’s  Maximum  Principle  (see  e.g. 
Feichtinger and Hartl, (1986), Seierstad and Sydsaeter, (1987)). The Hamiltonian function of 
this problem is as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ). ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( t S t P t t P F t I h t t t P t I H m m m m m m m m m - × + + × - = y y  
 
This problem is an optimal control problem with pure state variable constraints. To 
obtain the necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality we need the Lagrangian function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( t I t t t t P t I H t t t t P t I L m m m m m m m m m m m × + = l y l y  
 
Lemma 1  ( ) ) ( P ), ( I
d
m
d
m × ×  is the optimal solution of problem (1)-(2) if and only if there exists 
continuous function  ) (t m y  such that for all 0£ t£ T  0 ) ( ¹ t m y  and 
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    ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) t h t
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t t t t P t I L
t m m m
m
m m
d
m
d
m m
m l y
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l y ¶
y - = ⇒ - = & & ), ( ), ( ), ( ), (
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(b)   6 
   
( ) { } ( )
( ) { } ( ), ) t ( P F ) t ( P ) t ( t ), t ( ), t ( P ), t ( I H max
t ), t ( ), t ( P ), t ( I H t ), t ( ), t ( P ), t ( I H max
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(c)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 ³ = × t t I t m
d
m m l l , 
 
(d)  ( ) ( ) ( ) . 0 , 0 ³ = × T T I T m
d
m m y y  
 
 
We do not prove the above lemma, its proof can be found in the above mentioned 
literature. After optimal production strategy  ) (×
d
m P  is given we can solve problem (3)-(4). 
The Hamiltonian function of problem (3)-(4) is as follows 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ). ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( t P t P t t P F t I h t t t P t I H
d
m s s s s s s s s s - × + + × - = y y  
 
This problem is also an optimal control problem with pure state variable constraints. 
To get the necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality, we need again the Lagrangian 
function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( t I t t t t P t I H t t t t P t I L s s s s s s s s s s s × + = l y l y  
 
The proof of the following lemma can be found again in the mentioned literature. 
 
Lemma  2  ( ) ) ( ), ( × ×
d
s
d
s P I   is  optimal  solution  of  problem  (3)-(4)  if  and  only  if  there  exists 
continuous function  ) (t s y  such that for all 0£ t£ T  0 ) ( ¹ t s y  and 
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s
d
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(c)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 ³ = × t t I t s
d
s s l l , 
 
(d)  ( ) ( ) ( ) . 0 , 0 ³ = × T T I T s
d
s s y y  
 
Later we use the following notations: let 
d
m J  and 
d
s J  be the optimal values of cost 
functions (1) and (3) respectively, i.e. let 
 
( ) [ ]dt t P F t I h J
T
d
m m
d
m m
d
m ∫ + × =
0
) ( ) (    7 
 
and 
 
( ) [ ]dt t P F t I h J
T
d
s s
d
s s
d
s ∫ + × =
0
) ( ) ( . 
 
 
3 The centralized system 
 
In this section we solve the centralized model, i.e. the model, where the manufacturer and 
supplier coordinate their decisions. The model is as follows 
 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] min ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
0
® + × + + × =∫ dt t P F t I h t P F t I h J
T
s s s s m m m m ms         (5) 
s.t. 
 
T t t D t P t I m m £ £ - = 0 ), ( ) ( ) ( &                 (6) 
 
, 0 ), ( ) ( ) ( T t t P t P t I m s s £ £ - = &                 (7) 
 
 


 


=  


 


0
0
) 0 (
) 0 (
s
m
s
m
I
I
I
I
                    (8) 
 
The Hamiltonian function of model (5)-(8) is 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] [ ]. ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
)) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( (
t P t P t t S t P t t P F t I h t P F t I h
t t t P t I t P t I H
m s s m m s s s s m m m m
s m s s m m
- × + - × + - × - - × -
=
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The Lagrangian function is 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), (
), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), (
t I t t I t t t t t P t I t P t I H
t t t t t t P t I t P t I L
s s m m s m s s m m
s m s m s s m m
× + × + =
=
l l y y
l l y y
 
 
The following lemma formalizes the well-known optimality conditions. Its proof can be found 
in the literature mentioned in the previous section. 
 
Lemma 3  ( ) ) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( × × × ×
c
s
c
s
c
m
c
m P I P I  is optimal solution of problem (5)-(8) if and only if the 
following points hold  
 
1)  ( )
) ( ) (
) (
), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), (
t t h
t I
t t t t t t P t I t P t I L
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m
s m s m
c
s
c
s
c
m
c
m y l
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¶
¶
, 
  ( )
) ( ) (
) (
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t t h
t I
t t t t t t P t I t P t I L
s s s
s
s m s m
c
s
c
s
c
m
c
m y l
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¶
¶
,   8 
2)  ( ) { } ( ) ( ), ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( max
0 ) (
t P F t P t t t t t t P t I t P t I H
c
m m
c
m s m s m
c
s
c
s m
c
m
t Pm
- × - =
³
y y y y  
( ) { } ( ), ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( max
0 ) (
t P F t P t t t t t P t I t P t I H
c
s s
c
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c
s
c
m
c
m
t Ps
- × =
³
y y y    
3)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 ³ = × t t I t m
c
m m l l , 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 ³ = × t t I t s
c
s s l l , 
 
4)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . 0 , 0 ³ = × - T T I T T m
c
m s m y y y  
( ) ( ) ( ) . 0 , 0 ³ = × T T I T s
c
s s y y  
 
The optimal centralized production strategies for the manufacturer and the supplier 
respectively are 
 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) 


> - -
£ -
= - -
-
, t t F if , t t F
, t t F if ,
) t ( P
s m m s m m
s m m c
m
0
0 0
1 1
1
y y y y
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and 
 
[ ] ( ) ( )
[ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) 


>
£
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-
. t F if , t F
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s
0
0 0
1 1
1
y y
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Finally,  consider  a  notation:  let 
c
s
c
m
c
ms J J J + =   denote  the  optimal  value  of  cost 
function (5), where 
 
( ) [ ]dt t P F t I h J
T
c
m m
c
m m
c
m ∫ + × =
0
) ( ) (  
 
and 
 
( ) [ ]dt t P F t I h J
T
c
s s
c
s s
c
s ∫ + × =
0
) ( ) ( . 
 
4 The cooperative game theoretical solution of the cost sharing 
 
In this section we provide a sharing rule of the savings the cooperation induces. It is easy to 
see the following result: 
 
Lemma 4 
d
s
d
m
c
s
c
m
c
ms J J J J J + £ + = £ 0 . 
 
This result can be interpreted as follows: The total cost of the decentralized system, i.e. 
the  sum  of  the  supplier’s  and  manufacturer’s  costs  is  higher  than  that  of  the  centralized 
system. The question is now, how to share the savings induced by the players’ cooperation.  
  First, we introduce the concept of transferable utility cooperative games. Let N= {1, 
2,…, n} be the nonempty, finite set of the players. Moreover, let  Â ®
N v 2 :  be a function 
such  that  0 ) Ø ( = v ,  where 
N 2   is  for  the  class  of  all  subsets  of  N .  Then  v  is  called 
transferable utility (TU) cooperative game, henceforth game with player set  N .    9 
Game  v can be interpreted as every coalition (subset of  N ) has a value. E.g.  N S Í  
is a coalition consisting of the players of  S , and  ) (S v  is the value of coalition  S . The value 
of a coalition can be the profit the coalition members can achieve if they cooperate, or the cost 
they induce if they harmonize their actions.   
In our model there are two players: the manufacturer (m ) and the supplier (s), i.e. 
} , { s m N = ,  and  the  value  of  a  coalition  is  the  cost  the  coalition  member  induce  if  they 
coordinate their production plans and inventory strategies.  
  In the decentralized model the players do not harmonize their actions, they achieve 
their minimal costs independently of each other. Therefore (see Subsection 4.1) 
 
d
m J m v = }) ({   
 
and  
 
s
m J s v = }) ({ . 
 
In the centralized model the manufacturer and the supplier form a coalition, i.e. they 
cooperate. Therefore (see Subsection 4.2) 
 
c
ms J s m v = }) , ({ . 
 
Henceforth let v denote the supply chain game defined above. 
  To sum up the above discussion, the decentralized and the centralized model generate 
a (TU cooperative) game. 
To answer the question of how the players should share the savings their cooperation 
induces, we apply four solution concepts of cooperative game theory.  
First, we introduce the  concept of core (Gillies (1959)).  In our model  the core of 
supply chain game v is defined as follows: 
 
} , , : { ) (
} , { d
s s
d
m m
c
ms s m
s m J x J x J x x x v C £ £ = + Â Î = , 
 
where xm and xs are coordinates belonging to the manufacturer and the supplier respectively.  
  The  core  can  be  described  as  it  consists  of  allocations  of  the  total  cost  of  the 
centralized model in the way of that none of the players can be better off by leaving the 
centralized model, by stopping cooperation, i.e. the core consists of stable (robust) allocations 
of the costs. It is easy to see that in this model the core is not empty, i.e. there is a stable 
allocation of the costs. 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) introduced the concept of stable set. The stable set, 
also called Neumann-Morgenstern solution. In our model the stable set is as follows: 
Let  } , , : { ) (
} , { d
s s
d
m m
c
ms s m
s m J x J x J x x x v I £ £ = + Â Î = ,  then  ) (v I   is  called  the  set  of 
imputations in supply chain game v. The stable set of supply chain game v,  ) (v S  is a subset 
of  ) (v I  such that  
 
-  inner  stability:  for  any  ) (v S xÎ ,  there  does  not  exist  ) (v S yÎ   such  that 
s m s m x x y y + < + , 
-  outer  stability:  for  all  ) ( ) ( v S v I x - Î   there  exists  ) (v I yÎ   such  that 
s m s m x x y y + > + .   10 
 
The two stability conditions say that any element of the stable set cannot be better than 
any other point of the sable set, and for any imputation not in the stable set there exists an 
element of the stable set dominating the given imputation.  
It is easy to see that in this model since  ) ( ) ( v C v I =  and the two stability conditions 
are meaningless, we get the following result: 
 
Lemma 5 Any supply chain game v has a unique stable set, and  ) ( ) ( v C v S = . 
 
Both the core and the stable set have the disadvantage that those generally consist of 
many points, i.e. those are map-valued solutions. Therefore, the following natural question 
comes up: How can we pick up only one point as a solution? Next we consider two point-
valued solutions. 
Shapley (1953) introduced the following point-valued solution concept: The Shapley 
value of the manufacturer and the supplier respectively in supply chain game v 
 
( )
d
s
c
ms
d
m m J J J v Sh - + =
2
1
2
1
) ( , 
 
and 
 
( )
d
m
c
ms
d
s s J J J v Sh - + =
2
1
2
1
) ( . 
 
The Shapley value can be interpreted as it is an expected value of the given player’s 
marginal contribution. In other words, e.g. the manufacturer’s Shapley value is the expected 
value with uniform distribution (1/2-1/2) of the manufacturer’s marginal contribution to the 
cost of the two coalitions not containing her, to the empty collation (
d
m J ) and to coalition 
} {s (
d
s
c
ms J J - ).  
Next we show that in our model the Shapley solution is in the core and in the stable 
set, hence it is a real refinement of these two map-valued solution concepts. 
 
Lemma 6 For any supply chain game v ( ) ( ) v C v Sh v Sh s m Î ) ( , ) ( . 
Proof.  Take the manufacturer first: Lemma 4 implies that 
d
m
d
m
d
s
c
ms
d
m m J J J J J v Sh
2
1
2
1
) (
2
1
2
1
) ( + £ - + = ,  
i.e. 
d
m m J v Sh £ ) ( . In a similar way we can see that 
d
s s J v Sh £ ) ( .  
Finally, it is well-known that 
c
ms s m J v Sh v Sh = + ) ( ) (  (see e.g. Shapley (1953)).         ⁪ 
 
Lemmata 5 and 6 imply that the Shapley solution of supply chain game v is in the stable set, 
i.e.  ) ( ) ) ( , ) ( ( v S v Sh v Sh s m Î . 
At last, we give the nucleolus of supply chain games. Schmeidler (1969) introduced 
this point-valued solution concept (see Dreissen (1988)). The nucleolus of supply chain game 
v is 
   11 
 


 

 - +
=
- +
=
2
) ( ,
2
) (
d
m
d
s
c
ms
s
d
s
d
m
c
ms
m
J J J
v N
J J J
v N . 
 
The nucleolus can be interpreted as it is such an allocation that minimizes the maximal 
exceeds the coalitions can achieve.  It is  a slight calculation to see that in our model the 
nucleolus and the Shapley value coincide. This, the following lemma is about. 
 
Lemma 7 The nucleolus and the Shapley solution coincide in supply chain games, i.e. for any 
supply chain game v  ) ( ) ( v Sh v N = .  
 
Moreover, Lemma 5 implies that the nucleolus of supply chain games is in the stable 
set, i.e. for  any supply  chain  game  v ) ( ) ( v S v N Î .  It is well known that the nucleolus is 
always in the core, if the core is nonempty; therefore that the core of a supply chain game is 
not empty and Lemma 7 imply Lemma 5.    
 
5 A numerical example 
 
Take the following parameters and cost functions in problems (1)-(2), (3)-(4) and (5)-(8): 
 
-  the initial inventory level of the manufacturer:  Im0 = 0.5, 
-  the initial inventory level of the supplier:    Is0 = 0.3, 
-  the planning horizon:         T = 5 years, 
-  the demand rate of the manufacturer:    S(t) = 0.45·t
2, 
-  the inventory holding cost of the manufacturer:  hm = 2, 
-  the inventory holding cost of the supplier:    hs = 1, 
-  the production cost of the manufacturer:    Fm(Pm(t)) = 0.5× Pm
2(t), 
-  the production cost of the supplier:      Fs(Ps(t)) = 5× Ps
2(t). 
 
In the following we solve the decentralized and the centralized problem. 
 
5.1 The solution of the decentralized problem 
 
The  decentralized  problem  is  a  hierarchical  production  planning  problem.  First  the 
manufacturer solves her planning problem then the optimal ordering policy is forwarded to 
the  supplier.  Finally,  the  supplier  optimizes  her  own  relevant  costs  based  on  the  known 
ordering policy of the manufacturer. 
The problem of the manufacturer is as follows: 
 
[ ] min dt ) t ( P . ) t ( I m m ® × + × ∫
5
0
2 5 0 2  
s.t. 
 
5 0 , 5 . 0 ) 0 ( , 5 . 0 ) ( ) (
2 £ £ = × - = t I t t P t I m m m &  
 
The optimal solution is 
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


£ £ - ×
< £
=
, . t if , . t
, . t if ,
) t ( P
d
m 5 728 0 456 1 2
728 0 0 0
 
 
and 
 



£ £ × - + × -
< £ × -
=
. . t if , t . t t . .
, . t if , t . .
) t ( I
d
m 5 728 0 15 0 456 1 03 1
728 0 0 15 0 5 0
3 2
3
 
 
The minimal cost of the manufacturer is 62.078 units. 
In  the  next  step  we  solve  the  problem  of  the  supplier,  where  the  manufacturer’s 
ordering policy  ) (×
d
m P  is given: 
 
[ ] min ) ( 5 ) ( 1
5
0
2 ® × + × ∫ dt t P t I s s  
s.t. 
 
5 0 , ) 0 ( ), ( ) ( ) ( 0 £ £ = - = t I I t P t P t I s s
d
m s s &  
 
The optimal solution for the supplier is 
 
[ ] 5 , 0 , 1 . 0 334 . 0 ) ( Î × + = t t t P
d
s  
 
and 
 



£ £ - × + -
< £ × +
=
. . t if , t . t . .
, . t if , t . .
) t ( I
d
s 5 728 0 95 0 796 4 23 0
728 0 0 05 0 3 0
2
3
 
 
 
The minimal cost of the supplier is 342.096 units. 
 
5.2 The solution of the centralized problem 
 
In the following we solve the centralized problem: 
 
[ ] min dt ) t ( P ) t ( I ) t ( P . ) t ( I
T
s s m m ® × + × + × + × ∫
0
2 2 5 1 5 0 2  
s.t. 
 
5 0 ), ( ) ( ) ( £ £ - = t t S t P t I m m &  
 
5 0 ), ( ) ( ) ( £ £ - = t t P t P t I m s s &  
 
 


 


=  


 


3 . 0
5 . 0
) 0 (
) 0 (
s
m
I
I
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The optimal production rates are the followings: 
 
[ ] 5 , 0 , 15 . 1 ) ( Î + = t t t P
c
m  
 
and 
 
[ ] 5 , 0 , 2 . 0 09 . 3 ) ( Î × + = t t t P
c
s . 
 
The optimal inventory levels for the manufacturer and the supplier respectively are 
 
 
[ ] 5 , 0 , 15 . 0 5 . 0 15 . 1 5 . 0 ) (
3 2 Î × - × + × + = t t t t t I
c
m  
 
and 
 
[ ] 5 , 0 , 4 . 0 94 . 1 3 . 0 ) (
2 Î × - × + = t t t t I
c
s . 
 
The minimal cost of the centralized system is 400.425 units, where the manufacturer’s cost is 
67.056 units and the supplier’s cost is 333.369 units. 
 
5.3 Comparison of the solutions of the decentralized and the centralized system 
 
First, compare the production rate and inventory level of the manufacturer and the supplier in 
the cases of the decentralized and the centralized system, where Imd(t), Imc(t), Isd(t) and 
Isc(t) are for the inventory level for the manufacturer and for the supplier in the decentralized 
and the centralized model respectively. 
 
0 2 4
0
2
4
6
Imd t ( )
Imc t ( )
t  
Figure 2 The inventory level of the manufacturer in the decentralized and the 
centralized system 
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0 2 4
0
5
10
Isd t ( )
Isc t ( )
t  
Figure 3 The inventory level of the supplier in the decentralized and the centralized 
system 
 
In this example the inventory level of the manufacturer decreases in the case of cooperation, 
i.e.  in  the  centralized  system.  The  inventory  level  of  the  supplier  increases  when  the 
participants cooperate in the supply chain, see Figures 2 and 3. 
 
0 2 4
0
5
10
15
Pmd t ( )
Pmc t ( )
S t ( )
t  
Figure 4 The production rate of the manufacturer in the decentralized and the 
centralized system 
 
As we see, the production level in the centralized system is smoother, i.e. the growth of the 
production rate is smaller than that in the case of the decentralized system, and the contrary is 
true for the supplier, i.e. in the decentralized system the production rate of the supplier is 
smoother than that in the centralized system, where Pmd(t), Pmc(t), Psd(t) and Psc(t) are for 
the production level for the manufacturer and for the supplier in the decentralized and the 
centralized models respectively, and S(t) is for the exogenously given demand, see Figures 4 
and 5. This phenomenon is the decreased bullwhip effect in the centralized model. 
   15 
0 2 4
0
5
10
15
Psd t ( )
Psc t ( )
S t ( )
t  
Figure 5 The production rate of manufacturer in the decentralized and the centralized 
system 
 
The optimal costs of the decentralized and the centralized problem are presented in Table 1. 
 
  Decentralized 
problem 
Centralized 
Problem 
Manufacturer costs  62.078  67.056 
Supplier costs  342.069  333.369 
Total costs  404.148  400.425 
 
Table 1 The optimal costs 
 
As  we  have  seen,  the  total  cost  of  the  centralized  problem  is  lower  than  that  of  the 
decentralized one. The cost reduction is approximately 1%. In the centralized problem the 
manufacturer cost increases with more than 8% and the supplier cost decreases with 2.5%. 
After the above analysis the question of how to share the savings, the cooperation of 
the participants in the supply chain induces, comes up. 
 
5.4 Cost sharing 
 
The  Shapley  value  of  the  manufacturer  and  the  supplier  (it  coincides  with  the 
nucleolus and is in the core and in the stable set) are  217 . 60 ) ( = v Shm  and  208 . 340 ) ( = v Shs  
respectively. It means that the players share their savings equally. 
It  is  important  to  see  that  since  in  the  case  of  cooperation  67.056 =
c
m J   and 
333.369 =
c
s J  a transfer is needed to get the Shapley value: the supplier must transfer 6.839 
units to the manufacturer. It means that the manufacturer and the supplier agree on a contract 
such that the parties commit themselves to cooperate and the supplier commits herself to pay 
6.839 units to the manufacturer. 
 
6. Conclusion and further research 
 
In  this  paper  we  have  solved  two  two-stage  supply  chain  models:  a  decentralized  and  a 
centralized model. We have showed that the cooperation of the two players induces savings in 
costs.   16 
  In the next step we have considered sharing rules for the savings. We have applied 
cooperative  game  theory  solution  concepts  to  this  problem,  and  we  have  introduced  the 
concept of supply chain games. It was shown that in supply chain games the core and the 
stable set coincide, so do the Shapley value and the nucleolus; therefore the Shapley value is 
always in the core.   
  As an illustration for our results we have presented an exact number example. In this 
example the supplier’s cost of adaption in production to the fluctuations in the orderings of 
the manufacturer is higher than that of the manufacturer. Moreover, the production costs are 
dominant over the inventory costs. Therefore it is not surprising at all that in the centralized 
model the supplier has reduced her inventory level, and the manufacturer’s inventory level is 
higher than that in the decentralized model, and vice versa for the supplier.  
The reason of this fact is that the manufacturer minimizes her relevant cost in the 
decentralized model, so that her production level is near to the demand rate. After cooperation 
the manufacturer gives up to follow her cost optimal production strategy to allow the supplier 
to  reduce  her  own  production-inventory  cost  implying  a  decrease  in  the  total  cost  of  the 
supply  chain  as  well,  since  the  supplier’s  cost  saving  balances  out  the  increase  of  the 
manufacturer’s cost.  
This phenomenon points at the well known bullwhip effect of supply chains in a way: 
the supplier decreased the inventory level after information sharing (cooperation), and she 
adjusted her production rate closer to the demand rate. 
In  this  type  supply  chains  the  two  players  might  have  asymmetrical  roles.  It  can 
happen that the manufacturer has much stronger bargaining position than that of the supplier 
or vice versa. Since this asymmetry in the bargaining powers is exogenously given, it is not 
reflected by the proposed solution, by the Shapley value. The future research can propose 
solutions concepts which can reflect the exogenously given bargaining powers. 
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